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TAKING A BYTE OUT OF CRIME:
E-MAIL HARASSMENT AND THE INEFFICACY OF
EXISTING LAW
Gene Barton
Abstract- Computer abuse is advancing as quickly as computer technology. The laws,
however, have yet to address computer harassment to a significant degree. Existing law is
insufficient, and current efforts fall short of what is needed. This Comment identifies the
need for new law, examines the shortcomings of what has been tried to date, and proposes
general concepts for a comprehensive computer harassment law. This Comment concludes
with a proposal for specific legislation for the state of Washington.
Much like other technological advancements, the improved
accessibility and flexibility of the computer not only have enhanced
human capability but also have broadened the opportunity for mischief.
As a result, federal and state laws now address several types of computer
misuse and abuse in the commercial and research sectors, such as
intrusive and unauthorized computer access, or "hacking," the fraudulent
transfer of funds, and viral vandalism.' As personal computer use has
expanded, computer abuse has invaded the personal arena as well. It is
time again for the law to catch up to the technology.
Electronic mail, or E-mail, is one form of technology that has
outstripped the law's ability to keep pace. As E-mail use has grown,2
1. See, e.g., The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(1), (4), (5) (Supp. 1995);
Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(8) (West Supp. 1994).
The Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994 broadened the federal law regarding the
introduction of computer viruses. The act was a small part of the much larger omnibus crime bill,
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, which President Clinton signed into
law in September 1994.
Forty-eight states have computer crime legislation. Bradley S. Davis, It's Virus Season Again,
Has Your Computer Been Vaccinated? A Survey of Computer Crime Legislation as a Response to
Malevolent Software, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 411,423 (1994).
2. In 1991, it was estimated that the more than 8 million Americans using E-mail for business
purposes alone, up from 430,000 in 1980, would transmit approximately 8.5 billion messages that
year. Jennifer J. Griffin, The Monitoring of Electronic Mail in the Private Sector Workplace: An
Electronic Assault on Employee Privacy Rights, 4 Software L.J. 493,494-95 (1991).
The number of E-mail addresses in the United States has increased by 26,250,000 since 1987.
Rick Tetzeli, Surviving Information Overload, Fortune, July 11, 1994, at 60, 62.
The Microsoft Network will be included with Microsoft's Windows 95 software, due for release
later this year. It will be preloaded on virtually every Intel-based personal computer sold, which is
expected to add instant network access to 40 million computer purchases annually. Paul Andrews,
'Network' Rattles the Competition, Seattle Times, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al, A21.
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new forms of computer mischief unique to E-mail and its personal
applications also have arisen. Yet few laws address 6his problem. For
example, much of what might be illegal harassment if committed via
other media, such as the telephone, slips through the fingers of existing
law. Although the need for new laws has been recognized, attempts to
use or amend existing state and federal laws do not account for the full
scope of E-mail technology or harassment.
This Comment seeks to direct attention to the threat E-mail
harassment poses to computer privacy and provide some guidance in
developing laws in the area. Part I discusses the emerging nature and
scope of E-mail harassment and the need for criminal laws addressing the
problem. Part II then explores ways that existing laws might be used to
combat some forms of E-mail abuse and explains why efforts to apply
these laws to E-mail harassment in general will fail. Part III next
examines the shortcomings of two congressional bills designed to
address the problem. Part IV discusses general provisions for a
comprehensive E-mail harassment law. Finally, part V presents a
proposal for model legislation in Washington.
I. THE EMERGING NOTION OF E-MAIL HARASSMENT AND
THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL LAWS
The technology that has facilitated communication between once-
isolated computer users has an unfortunate side effect. It also fosters a
wide range of abuse, from the innocent to the intentional and harmful.
The latter, which makes headlines on a regular basis, is best dealt with in
a criminal context that can serve notice on would-be violators, act as a
deterrent, and impose meaningful penalties.
When computers first evolved from massive machines that filled
entire rooms to devices no larger than portable television sets, each
computer user was isolated. Today, because of major international
computer networks,3 anyone with a computer or access to one can enjoy
inexpensive4 and virtually instantaneous communication with any other
network user in the world.' These E-mail systems make, possible the free
exchange of messages in a manner similar to talking on the telephone
3. The federally subsidized Internet connects more than 5,000 networks and 1.7 million computers
throughout the United States and abroad, and is now frequented by more than 20 million users.
Davis, supra note 1, at 418 n.40. Growth on the Internet is estimated to be as high as 15% a month.
Michael W. Miller, Contact High, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1993, at R4.
4. Joanna Pearlstein, How Much Do Online Services Really Cost?, Macworld, Aug. 1994, at 93.
5. Griffin, supra note 2, at 498.
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and writing a letter, but with advantages over both, combining the
telephone's immediacy with a letter's thoroughness.6
E-mail is computer text sent instantaneously over telephone lines,7
requires no middleman other than a network relay computer, and needs
no human receiver on the other end, merely another computer ready to
receive the incoming message.8 Some internal E-mail systems can be set
up without using telephone lines by connecting desktop computers
through a main-frame computer.9 In a basic telephone connection
between two computers, 10 each user needs a computer with word
processing capabilities; a modem, which connects computers over
telephone lines; a telephone; and communications software.1' Under
more elaborate telephone set-ups, an E-mail network provides services to
subscribers. 2 The sender types the message and designates its
destination. 3 The network's central computer then either directly
transmits the message to the recipient's "mailbox"' 4 or stores it until the
recipient electronically collects it.5
Due to the flood of users caused by E-mail's ease of access 6 and
relatively low cost, E-mail sent for improper purposes, including
harassment, has followed. 7 In the E-mail lexicon, a harassing message is
known as "flaming," a general term describing vitriolic E-mail sent to the
6. Louis H. Milrad, E-mail a Happy Marriage of Telephone and Letter, Can. Law., Aug. 1985, at
20.
7. Ruel Torres Hernandez, ECPA and Online Computer Privacy, 41 Fed. Comm. L.. 17, 19-21
(1988).
8. Milhd, supra note 6, at 20.
9. Hemandez, supra note 7, at 22.
10. Griffin, supra note 2, at 496-97 n.18.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. "The 'mailbox' is a storage area for digitally encoded information; the message remains there
until the recipient checks the mailbox and reads his messages. Either party may store the message
electronically, on magnetic media, or print the message onto paper." John Robinson Thomas, Legal
Responses to Commercial Transactions Employing Novel Communications Media, 90 Mich. L. Rev.
1145, 1146 n.9 (1992).
15. Griffin, supra note 2, at 496-97 n.18.
16. Many major universities, such as the University of Washington, Yale, and Harvard, provide
free E-mail access for their students, staff, and faculty. Laura Duncan, Egregious E-Mail Etiquette
Sparks Seminar, Chi. Daily L. Bull., June 17, 1994, at 3.
17. Rochelle Sharpe, Work Week, Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1994, at Al ("Electronic mail opens new
avenues for harassing colleagnes .... Some employees sexually harass coworkers via computer,
sending vulgar notes. Divorcing couples who work together have signed on using their spouse's
name and password-then sent inflammatory messages to their spouse's supervisor.").
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person insulted or derided. 8 In its most egregious manif~estation, flaming
is a massive "mailing" of vituperative, sexually suggestive, or
meaningless messages by a group of E-mail users acting either in concert
or not, which is designed to intimidate one or more other users. The
targets often are women. 9 Another form of E-mail abuse is the mail
bomb or letter bomb, a long E-mail message that ties up a recipient's
system by consuming its computer memory.2 °
Using a telephone to constantly call another person, with the intent
either to harass the person when the phone is answered. or to tie up that
person's telephone, is illegal in most states,2" as are the telephone
equivalents of flaming and other abusive E-mail techniques.' Although
E-mail harassment can be more severe than telephone harassment,' few
statutes apply to E-mail.24
This legal gap is best handled criminally, not in a civil' or private
commercial context, where an E-mail abuser faces little sanction other
than the temporary loss of access to an E-mail network.26 Given the bulk
of messages and subscribers that E-mail networks handle, they are ill-
equipped and too inaccessible to efficiently address complaints of E-mail
abuse. Networks teid to be distant and impersonal, dealing with
18. Barbara Kantrowitz, Men, Women & Computers, Newsweek, May 16, 1994, at 48.
19. Id. at 54 ("Some men say the on-line hostility [toward women] comes from resentment over
women's slowly entering what has been an almost exclusively male domain."). See also Deborah
Tannen, Gender Gap in Cyberspace, Newsweek, May 16, 1994, at 52,53.
20. Paul Andrews, Behind the Mask, Seattle Times, Nov. 20, 1994, at JI, 36 ("Mail bombs are
going to have to be controlled. Otherwise it's the death of the system' because bombs tax resources
so heavily.") (quoting University of Wisconsin Professor Leonard Levine, who moderates an
Internet forum on computer privacy).
21. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(2) (Supp. 1995), for text see infra note 65; Mich.
Comp. Laws § 750.540e(l)(g) (1991). The Michigan law defines as a misdemeanor calling "a
telephone of another person in a repetitive manner which causes interruption in telephone service or
prevents the person from utilizing his or her telephone service."
22. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(1), for text see infra note 65.
23. In fact, many people say and do things on E-mail that they would not dare say or do over the
telephone. See Owen Edwards, The Grating Communicator, Forbes ASAP. Oct. 25, 1993, at 160,
161; Deborah Asbrand, E-mail 'Flame' Messages Can Ignite Office Angst, Infoworld, Dec. 6, 1993,
at 74.
24. See infra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
25. For the civil implications of E-mail and other network abuse, see Hery H. Perritt Jr., Tort
Liability, the First Amendment, and Equal Access to Electronic Networks, 5 Harv. J.L. & Tech.,
Spring 1992, at 65. See also Cubby v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.'N.Y. 1991) (concerning
libel suit over statements made in newsletter available through computer network).
26. Independent networks and those "providing services in connection with Internet impose
[content-based] 'acceptable use policies' as a condition of supplying their services." Perritt, supra
note 25, at 111.
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complaints only through warnings to abusers and, ultimately, access
denials.27 Local authorities are closer, act more directly, and wield a
strong deterrent. Laws criminalizing anonymous E-mail also may have
the dual effect of increasing the use and effectiveness of networks.28
Finally, mere access sanctions fail to recognize the harm that E-mail
abuse causes the recipient. A person who sends abusive E-mail is likely
to continue such abuse in other ways even if access is cut off.29
II. EXISTING LAWS DO NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE
NATURE AND SCOPE OF E-MAIL HARASSMENT
Many prosecutors facing cases of E-mail harassment will be
hamstrung by laws written with other media and/or technology in mind,
that fail to address the issue directly, or that are too inflexible to
encompass the new technology. 0 Prosecutors could apply existing laws
in limited instances, but no general solution is available, even within
telephone harassment laws, unless new laws are passed.
Only Alabama,31  Idaho,32  New Hampshire,33  and New York
34
specifically include electronic communication other than the telephone
27. Adam S. Bauman, Computer Pirates Set Sail Upon the Internet, Seattle Times, Nov. 3, 1994,
at Al, A2 ("By design, the Internet lacks any central administrative authority, and security
procedures could interfere with the philosophy of free and open communications that is integral to
the network.').
28. Andrews, supra note 20, at J6 ("In whatever permutation, anonymity may have to ebb for the
Internet to be taken seriously as a communications organ and financial-transaction medium. As it
stands, 'People don't know what to trust on the Internet.") (quoting University of Wisconsin
Professor Leonard Levine).
29. Cristina Carmody, Stalking by Computer, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 70 (E-mail is 'just another
tool a sophisticated, intellectual, creative stalker will use. They come up with whatever they can.")
(quoting Michigan domestic violence expert Kathleen Hagenian).
30. The inherent difficulties of applying outmoded law and similar examples of historical conflict
between old laws and new technology were illustrated in a 1992 symposium at the Villanova
University Law School. See Symposium, The Congress, the Courts and Computer Based
Communications Networks: Answering Questions About Access and Content Control, 38 Vill. L.
Rev. 319,343-44 (1993).
31. Ala. Code § 13A-11-8(b)(1)(a) (1994) specifically includes "electronic communication"
within its proscribed forms of harassing communications. The statute, oddly enough, was passed in
1978, well before the E-mail explosion. Its language is remarkably similar to that of the former
Colorado harassment statute ruled unconstitutionally overbroad in Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80
(Colo. 1975). This specific issue has not been litigated in Alabama.
32. Idaho Code § 18-6710(3) (Supp. 1994) defines telephone as "any device which provides
transmission of messages, signals, facsimiles, video images or other communication between persons
who are physically separated from each other by means of telephone, telegraph, cable, wire or the
projection of energy without physical connection." This language was added in 1994.
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within a general or telephone harassment statute.35 Michigan and three
other states include electronic communication among the elements of
"unconsented contact" in anti-stalking statutes.36 Several states include
written communication, which could be applied to E-mail, within the
proscriptions of general harassment statutes." Federal law does not
define any crimes related to sending E-mail."
Other laws could be applied to certain offenses involving E-mail.
Michigan defines crimes of malicious annoyance by writing39 and
malicious use of a service provided by a communications common
carrier.4" Other states present possible applications within their anti-
stalking statutes.41 Washington's statute governing sexual exploitation of
children makes it a misdemeanor or a felony to corranunicate with a
minor for immoral purposes.42
33. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:4(1H) (Supp. 1994) defines "communicates" as "to impart a
message by any method of transmission, including but not limited to tel-.-phoning or personally
delivering or sending or having delivered any information or material by written or printed note or
letter, package, mail, courier service or electronic transmission." This language was added in 1994.
34. N.Y. Penal Law § 240.30 (McKinney Supp. 1995) includes "communication... initiated by
mechanical or electronic means" as proscribed forms of harassing communications. This language
was added in 1992.
35. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-35-17 (1994) contains a more vague reference to "telecommunication
device," which probably would include a computer-modem-telephone hookup.
36. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.41 1h(1)(e)(vi) (Supp. 1994), for text see inf,-a note 43; Alaska Stat.
§ 11.41.270 (Supp. 1994); Okla. Stat. fit. 21, § 1173 (Supp. 1995); Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-506 (Supp.
1994).
37. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-182b, 183 (1994); Iowa Code § 708.7 (1992.); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 525.080 (Baldwin 1984); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 (West 1994).
38. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994), includes privacy
protections for electronic communication, making it illegal for a person to intercept or gain
unauthorized access to electronic communication, or alter or obtain stored communications, or to
disclose the contents of intercepted E-mail to others. Hemandez, supra note 7, at 29-30.
39. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.390 (1991).
40. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.540e, for text see supra note 21.
41. D.C. Code Ann. § 22-504 (Supp. 1994), Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730 (1993) (writing or written
communication included within definition of proscribed contact); Cal. Pend Code § 646.9 (West
Supp. 1994), Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 (Supp. 1993), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1995), Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1061 (Supp. 1994) (communication or writing included generally within threat
element); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.575 (1993) (possible application within "course of conduct"
definition).
42. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.68A.090 (Supp. 1995). The recent E-mail case of a 51-year-old Seattle
man, Alan Barlow, was prosecuted under this statute. Barlow contacted underage girls via E-mail
and told them of his sexual fantasies about them, asked them to send him nude photographs through
regular mail, and arranged personal meetings. Prosecutors said Barlow exchanged E-mail with at
least eight adolescent girls over a period of nearly three years. Dan Rfley, Man Charged in
Computer 'Date' with Teen, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 21, 1994, at BI, B2. Barlow pleaded
guilty on March 23, 1995, to two counts of communicating with a minor fcr immoral purposes, in
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An example of the complexities involved in applying such laws to E-
mail is being played out in Michigan, where the legislature included an
electronic communications provision within its anti-stalking statute 3
after several women testified that they had been harassed by computer
users." In what has been recognized as the first prosecution of its kind in
the nation, Andrew C. Archambeau has been charged with misdemeanor
violations of the statute in connection with E-mail messages that he sent
to a woman he had met through a video dating service.45 Between
February 17, 1994, the day they met, and April 24, 1994, Archambeau
sent the woman approximately twenty unwelcome or threatening E-mail
messages, as well as ten letters and packages.46
Because the anti-stalking statute under which Archambeau has been
charged is of questionable constitutionality,47 his lawyers have attacked it
on several grounds, alleging it to be overbroad and vague. 8 Their
strongest argument is that the statute lacks a specific intent element49 and
addition to other charges. Telephone interview with Mary Koch, King County Prosecutor's Office
(March 27, 1995).
43. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.411h(1)(e) provides: "'Unconsented contact' includes, but is not
limited to, any of the following: ... (vi) Sending mail or electronic communications to that
individual."
44. Thom Weidlich, Is Stubborn E-Mail Romeo a Stalker? Case May Put Anti-Stalking Laws on
Trial, Nat'l L.J., June 20, 1994, at A7.
45. Peter H. Lewis, Persistent E-Mail: Electronic Stalking or Innocent Courtship?, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 16, 1994, at BI1.
46. Five days after Archambeau and the woman met, she told him, "via E-mail, that she had no
romantic interest in him. He persisted with E-mail, phone messages and postal mail.... She
responded politely at first, but more angrily as time went on, at one point accusing him of stalking
and warning him that she would contact the police if he did not stop."
After Archambeau left an allegedly threatening message on the woman's answering machine, the
woman took the tape recording to a police detective, who contacted Archambeau and told him to
stop contacting the woman.
"That night, Mr. Amhambeau... sent her another E-mail note consisting of a symbol that in the
peculiar language of E-mail means that the sender is sticking his tongue out at the recipient."
"The woman used a computer alias to respond, reminding Mr. Archambeau that he had been
warned to stop messaging her."
"The woman and the police say that Mr. Archambeau then sent E-mail saying that he would
discuss the woman's behavior with friends on America Online, her co-workers and supervisors, her
family and former boyfriends.... Several days later charges were filed." Id
47. James C. Wickens, Michigan's New Anti-Stalking Laws: Good Intentions Gone Awry, 1994
Det. C.L. Rev. 157, 207-09 (questioning the constitutionality of four sections of the statute).
48. Telephone interview with defense lawyer Matthew Leitman (Oct. 12, 1994). See discussion
of constitutional challenges infra part TV.
49. Courts have consistently held that specific intent is vital when statutes seek to proscribe
speech. See infra notes 10 1-107 and accompanying text.
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thereby chills certain forms of protected speech. 0 A leading Michigan
case, People v. Taravella,51 and two commentators 52 support the
defense's contentions. The trial court has yet to rule on the defense's
motion to dismiss.
Although the Michigan anti-stalking law could be amended to bring it
into line with Taravella, merely adding electronic communication
provisions to anti-stalking statutes does not adequately address the scope
of E-mail harassment. Such a construction would not proscribe single
incidents of anonymous, obscene, or threatening E-mail, or such abuse as
mass flaming or letter bombs. 3 The very essence of anti-stalking
statutes requires repeated contact. Also, such statute. in general have
been criticized for their inconsistent wording and application,
questionable constitutionality, and duplication of existing harassment
statutes.54
Therefore, resorting solely to anti-stalking statutes and other laws
applicable only under isolated circumstances would proscribe some
forms of E-mail harassment and not others. The varied language and
potential for different interpretation and application of such statutes also
would prevent the development of any consistent law. Although E-mail
also conceivably could be addressed under laws concerning harassment
through the mail, only a few states have such provisions and, even then,
only within general harassment statutes that also include telephone
harassment. Finally, while several federal offenses relate to the content
of mail, such as obscene or threatening mail,55 there is no federal statute
regarding harassment through the mail.
50. Leitman cites the examples of an aggressive protester in a public park or an intense debate on
health care, which conceivably could cause the sort of emotional distress on which the statute hinges.
Leitman interview, supra note 48.
51. 350 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). The Taravella case challenged the constitutionality
of a state statute proscribing the malicious use of telephone and telegraph services, Mich. Comp.
Laws § 750.540e, for text see supra note 21. In upholding the statute, the court said, "it is the
malicious intent with which the transmission is made that establishes the criminality of the
conduct... An individual of ordinary intelligence would not have to guess as to the type and scope
of conduct prohibited under our statute...." 350 N.W. 2d at 784.
52. Wickens, supra note 47, at 159; Ellen F. Sohn, Antistalking Statites: Do They Actually
Protect Victims?, 30 Crim. L. Bull. 203, 228-29, 231 (1994).
53. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
54. Sohn, supra note 52; Wickens, supra note 47; Robert A. Guy Jr., The Nature and
Constitutionality of Stalking Laws, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 991 (1993); Wayne E. Bradburn Jr., Stalking
Statutes: An Ineffective Legislative Remedy for Rectifying Perceived Problems with Today's
Injunction System, 19 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 271 (1993); Gera-Lind Kolarik, Stalking Laws Proliferate,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 35.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 876, 877 (1988).
Vol. 70:465, 1995
E-Mail Harassment
State and federal laws on telephone harassment provide the only
realistic basis for a general application of existing law to E-mail. 6 All
fifty states have statutes governing telephone harassment." But like anti-
stalking statutes and other existing laws that can be applied to E-mail
only in piecemeal fashion, the language of most of the telephone
harassment statutes restricts their application to*E-mail.5
The federal and Washington laws present two such examples. 9 The
phrase "by means of telephone" in the federal law could be interpreted to
56. Courts extended the First Amendment doctrines, developed in the context of disseminating
print-on-paper information, to the first electronic communications in a straightforward manner. It is
appropriate to use telephone technology as the basis for further extension to computer
communications. Perritt, supra note 25, at 119.
57. Ala. Code § 13A-11-8 (1994); Alaska Stat. § 11.61.120 (Supp. 1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-2916 (1989); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-209 (Michie 1993); Cal. Penal Code § 653m (West Supp.
1995); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-111 (1990 & Supp. 1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a-182b, 53a-183
(1994); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 1311, 1312 (Supp. 1994); Fla. Stat. ch. 365.16 (Supp. 1995); Ga.
Code Ann. §§ 16-11-39, 46-5-21 (1992); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1106 (Supp. 1994); Idaho Code §
18-6710 (Supp. 1994); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 720, 135/1-1 (1993); Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2 (1994); Iowa
Code § 708.7 (1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4113 (Supp. 1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.080
(Baldwin 1984); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-285 (West 1986); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 506
(West 1983); Md. Ann. Code of 1957 27, § 555A (1992); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 269, § 14A (1992);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.540e (1991); Minn. Stat. § 609.749 (Supp. 1995); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-
29-45 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090 (1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213 (1994); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 28-1310 (1989); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.255 (1993); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:4 (Supp. 1994);
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:33-4 (Supp. 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-12 (1994); N.Y. Penal Law §
240.30 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-196 (1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07
(1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.21 (Anderson 1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1172 (Supp. 1995);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.090 (1993); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5504 (1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-35-17
(1994); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-430 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 49-31-
31 (1993); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-308 (1991); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07 (West 1994); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-9-201 (1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1027 (Supp. 1994); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-427
(Michie 1988); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230 (Supp. 1994); W. Va. Code § 61-8-16 (1992); Wis. Stat.
§ 947.012 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. Stat. § 6-6-103 (1988).
58. The existing statutes, which depend upon communication over telephone lines, also would not
address interoffice situations in which E-mail connections are made not via telephone lines, but
through an internal computer network. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
59. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1988); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230. For the text of the Washington
statute, see infra note 65. The federal law prohibits obscene or harassing telephone calls in the
District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications. The statute states:
(a) Whoever
(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication by means of
telephone-
(A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or indecent;
(B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, without disclosing his identity
and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number,
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incorporate E-mail and other electronic communication over telephone
lines. However, specific references to telephone calls in two sections
seem to negate such a broad reading.' The connection is further
complicated by the phrase "during which conversation ensues," 61 which
does not describe E-mail in general.62 Finally, legislative intent presents
a problem.63 The federal law was enacted in 1934, decades before the
advent of fax machines and E-mail, and was last amended in 1989
without being adapted for such electronic communication.64
The Washington law presents similar, if not graver, problems. The
statute clearly limits its reach to "a telephone call."6 Giving this phrase
(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent to
harass any person at the called number; or
(D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any
person at the called number, or
(2) knowingly permits any telephone facility under his control to be used for any purpose
prohibited by this section,
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (D).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D).
62. A court might deem E-mail sent with software that transmits messages in true or simulated
voice or the exchange of E-mail messages in real time over "chat' lines as conversation, but
probably would go no further. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary drfines "conversation" as
the "oral exchange of sentiments, observations, opinions, or ideas," which would argue against
deeming the normal exchange of E-mail messages to be conversation. The leading case construing
the federal telephone harassment law and its requirement of conversation also seems to require that
some words be spoken, but not exchanged, in order to satisfy the statute's conversational aspect.
United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978). See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying
text. But see Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks ana Cyberspace, 38 Vili. L.
Rev. 403, 427 (1993) (noting the similarities between E-mail and the telephone). Katsh is a
professor of legal studies at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. See infra notes 68-71 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Katsh's analysis.
63. Hernandez, supra note 7, at 18, 28.
64. Bills introduced in the House and Senate would amend the federal law to address electronic
communication. See infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text.
65. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230 is titltd: "Telephone calls to harass, intimidate, torment or
embarrass." The statute, in pertinent part, provides:
Every person who, with intent to harass, intimidate, torment or embarrass any other person, shall
make a telephone call to such other person:
(1) Using any lewd, lascivious, profane, indecent, or obscene words or language, or suggesting
the commission of any lewd or lascivious act; or
(2) Anonymously or repeatedly or at an extremely inconvenient hour, whether or not
conversation ensues; or
(3) Threatening to inflict injury on the person or property of the person called or any member of
his family or household;
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its ordinary and customary meaning,6" little else can be read into the
statute. Had the legislature intended to include E-mail within the law, it
easily could have done so when it last amended the law in 1992.
To convince a judge to extend the reach of the Washington or federal
statute to E-mail would require Olympic-caliber legal gymnastics.67 Still,
the connection is possible, though tenuous. First, the analysis by
Professor Katsh6 equating E-mail with a telephone call69 could be
applied as a first step in arguing to extend the reach of the Washington
statute to E-mail.7" Second, his comparison of a computer receiving E-
mail to an answering machine bolsters application of the federal law, but
requires more roundabout reasoning to extend the reach of the section
under which general E-mail harassment would have to fall.
71
The effort to apply federal law to E-mail centers on an analysis of
United States v. Lampley.72 In Lampley, the appellant, Franklin D.
Lampley, had been convicted on seven counts of making harassing
interstate telephone calls during which conversation ensued. Some of the
counts related to Lampley's attempts to make collect telephone calls to a
former girlfriend during a string of harassing calls made to her residence
and that of her mother in 1974 and 1975. During some calls, neither
Lampley nor the person called would speak. Only the operator would
shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor....
66. Certain rules of statutory construction apply, including the basic proposition that legislative
enactments are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning in the absence of some clear
indication of legislative intent to the contrary. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Retirement Bd. v. Yelle,
31 Wash. 2d 87, 201 P.2d 172 (1948); Parkhurst v. Everett, 51 Wash. 2d 292, 318 P.2d 327 (1957).
67. Hernandez, supra note 7, at 28 ('"Judges are not authorized to amend statutes even to bring
them up-to-date.") (quoting Federal Appeals Court Judge Richard Posner from Cohodas, Congress
Races to Stay Ahead of Technology, 44 Cong. Q. Wldy. Rep. 1233 (1986)).
68. See supra note 62.
69. Professor Katsh makes the following comparison:
In the simplest use of the computer for communication, an individual uses the machine in a
manner similar to a telephone, composing a message and sending it over the network to another
computer, which stores it until a second human looks at the information.... In the future, when
sounds may be sent as part of an e-mail message, and when we become accustomed to hearing
sounds emanating from the computer, this connection to the telephone will become more
obvious and the mail analogy may appear anachronistic.
Katsh, supra note 62, at 427.
70. See Perritt, supra note 25, at 121 ('[P]rotection of commercial speech justifies no distinction
between different types of electronic communication.").
71. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D). The other sections of the federal statute, which deal with obscene
and anonymous telephone calls and the continuous ringing of another person's telephone, do not
lend themselves to E-mail application.
72. 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978).
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speak once the connection was made. Upon hearing fiat Lampley was
attempting to make a collect call, the receiving party would hang up.
Nevertheless, the court held that the law was violated. 3 In addition, state
courts have held that messages left on answering machines can violate
telephone harassment laws.74 Combining these concepts, one could
argue that because an E-mail message is equivalent to a message left on
an answering machine under Professor Katsh's analysis, and because
verbal contact between the parties is not required for conversation to
ensue under Lampley, a harassing E-mail message violates the federal
law.75 But the Lampley court's reliance on the fact that an operator spoke
first to Lampley and then to the party who received the call weakens this
argument.76  Lampley seems to require that some words be spoken,
though not necessarily between the calling and receiving parties, before
the federal law is violated.77
Given the problems such interpretations entail, new laws addressing
this new technology are an easier solution than forcing prosecutors to
wrestle with laws that were designed for other -dmes and other
technologies. Such laws, however, must take a comprehensive approach
to the particular problems E-mail abuse presents. This effort requires
more than a mere attempt to equate E-mail harassment with telephone
harassment.
73. Id. at 788 ("It was not the intention of Congress to permit the persork who abuses telephonic
communication to evade liability under § 223(1)()) by the device of placing only operator-assisted
calls.... Communication sufficient to constitute 'conversation' occurs when the operator speaks to
the listening recipient."). Similarly, it could be argued that it was not the intent of Congress to allow
persons to evade the law by sending harassing messages via E-mail.
74. State v. Placke, 733 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("The fact that the calls were
recorded on tape has no less disturbing impact on the victim than had appellant spoken with him
personally."); see also Jones v. Municipality of Anchorage, 754 P.2d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988);
Harris v. State, 380 S.E.2d 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). All of the statutes in question in these cases,
however, either proscribed telephone harassment "whether or not conversation ensues" or had no
conversation clause.
75. Such contortions are unnecessary under Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(2) and 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(a)(1)(B), which do not require that conversation ensue.
76. See 573 F.2d at 788.
77. See supra note 62.
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III. PROPOSED BILLS NOT SPECIFICALLY TAILORED TO THE
NATURE AND SCOPE OF E-MAIL HARASSMENT ARE
INSUFFICIENT
Bills introduced in the House and Senate to amend the federal law do
not fully address the scope and nature of E-mail harassment and are
insufficient solutions to the problem. Although the bills recognize that
E-mail harassment is a national problem, more comprehensive legislation
is required.
A. House Bill Fails to Address Scope of E-Mail; Technological
Differences
The Electronic Anti-Stalking Act of 199478 is misguided, though it
shows admirable intent. Simply adding electronic communications to the
definition of "telephone" does not account for the technological
differences between the telephone and the computer and the ways in
which they are used. For example, calling that causes another person's
telephone to ring "repeatedly or continuously'" is not a phenomenon
that can be applied to E-mail simply by equating E-mail with a telephone
call. ° An E-mail solution requires statutory language that directly
addresses mass flaming and letter bombs.8"
78. H.R. 5015. Representative Kweisi Mfume, D-Md., introduced the bill on Aug. 21, 1994. In
pertinent part, it provides that:
Section 223(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 223(a)) is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new sentence: "For purposes of subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D),
the terms 'telephone' and 'telephone call' include communications by means of computer
modem or any other two-way wire or radio telecommunications device."
The bill did not receive substantive consideration before the 103rd Congress adjourned.
Representative Mfiime reintroduced the measure in the 104th Congress as H.R. 112. Telephone
interview with Nyrma Colon, aide to Representative Mfume (Jan. 26, 1995).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C).
80. The amendment does nothing under this section to make any use of E-mail a crime. Sending
an E-mail message does not cause another person's computer or modem to ring "repeatedly or
continuously." An E-mail user often is not aware that a message is coming in or has come in until
the user accesses his or her mailbox, although some programs are designed to emit an audible signal
when an E-mail message is received. An effort to apply the language of this section to E-mail
simply will not work. One might argue that the policy that prompted Congress to outlaw continuous
ringing of a person's telephone applies with equal force to tying up a person's computer line. But an
amendment designed to address a specific technological problem should not have to rely upon such a
strained analogy in order to be applicable to that technology.
81. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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The House bill has other shortcomings. By failing to extend its reach
to the subsection on obscene telephone calls, the bill ignores the fact that
an E-mail message may contain a "comment, request, suggestion or
proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or iridecent. '82 There
is no technological nor legal reason for such an exclusion.83 An obscene
E-mail message has the same potential as a telephone -all for inflicting
emotional distress on the recipient. The social and moral justifications
for imposing criminal penalties for such communication also are the
same.84 Further, there is no justification for settiag out different
definitions of the same term for different sections of the law. Such
wording begs for inconsistent interpretation and application.
The amendment also does nothing to pull E-mail under the federal
law's conversational requirement. 5 Lampley demonstrates the difficulty
of arguing that conversation ensues in the E-mail context.86 Thus, any
attempt to apply the amendment to E-mail urder 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(a)(1)(D), even with a modified definition of telephone and
telephone calls, is likely to fail. The proper solution is general wording
along the lines of subsection (a)(1)(B), which proscribes anonymous
calls "whether or not conversation ensues." This would proscribe
harassing E-mail whether messages are read in whole, in part, or at all.
However, this distinction should not be restricted to anonymous
messages." A person who reads harassing messages and a person who
accesses her E-mail mailbox only to see that there are messages from
someone whom she fears88 can be similarly affected. 9
82. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A).
83. The bill does not extend the new definition to subsection (a)(1)(A) because "telephone" does
not appear in the current version of that subsection. The focus of the bill is not on language, but on
harassment, repeated calls, intent, and threatening contacts. Colon interview, supra note 78.
Subsection (a)(1)(A), however, is modified by the phrase "by means of telephone" in section (a)(l).
84. See United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783,787 (3d Cir. 1978), in which the court stated:
Not all speech enjoys the protection of tht First Amendment, Chaplinsloy v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), and in enacting [47 U.S.C.] § 223 the Congress had a compelling interest
in the protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse or annoyance at the hands of persons
who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but for other unjustifiable motives.
85. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D).
86. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
87. The reason for this distinction between anonymous telephone calls and those in which the
caller is identified is not readily apparent, except to the extent that it serves to address some of the
peculiarities of anonymous calls, such as "breathers" or callers who do not ,peak. See, e.g., People
v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331 (11. 1977). Some states do not make this distinction. See, e.g., Ala.
Code § 13A-11-8(b)(1)b (1994).
88. The list of messages in an E-mail mailbox typically contains the E-mail address and/or name
of the sender. The telephone corollary is a caller ID box, which displays the telephone number of
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B. Senate Bill: A More Reasoned Approach Still Falls Short
A Senate bill amending the federal law' takes a much more reasoned
approach, noting the differences between telephone and computer
technologies." For example, it does not attempt to pull E-mail and other
the person calling. Under federal law and similarly worded state statutes that proscribe repeated
calling with the intent to harass whether or not conversation ensues, a person still may be harassed
upon recognizing the number of the caller. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9.61.230(2).
89. The effect of unread messages is, in fact, one of the issues in the Archambeau case, supra
notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Archambeau contends that he could not have stalked the
woman if she did not read all of the messages. Carmody, supra note 29, at 70. The prosecution
thinks otherwise. Although the victim did not read some of the messages which Archambeau sent to
her, she saw them in her mailbox and recognized Archambeau as the sender. Under the
prosecution's theory, then, the woman was harassed each time she accessed her mailbox and saw a
new message from Archambeau. Telephone interview with prosecutor Kelly Chard (Oct. 3, 1994).
Prodigy, one of many commercial on-line networks, offers subscribers something called a "bozo
filter," which enables users to shield themselves from electronic mail sent by certain individuals.
Andrews, supra note 20, at J6.
90. The amendments, introduced by Senator Jim Exon, D-Neb., on July 26, 1994, were first
included in The Telecommunications Reform Act of 1994. The Senate Commerce Committee
approved the bill, including Senator Exon's amendments, but Senator Bob Dole, R-Kan., blocked its
introduction on the floor of the Senate. Telephone interview with Mike Kangior, aide to Senator
Exon (Sept. 29, 1994). Senator Exon reintroduced his proposed amendments as part of a
controversial stand-alone bill, The Communications Decency Act, on Feb. 1, 1995. Senator Slade
Gorton, R-Wash., signed on as the first co-sponsor. The bill stands a strong chance of passage
without the link to the omnibus telecommunications reform bill, elements of which Senator Dole
opposed. Telephone interview with Mike Kangior (Feb. 2, 1995). The Senate Commerce
Committee passed the bill in March.
91. Senator Exon's amendments, in pertinent part, would result in a new version of 47 U.S.C.
§ 223 as follows:
(a) Whoever -
(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication by means of
telecommunications device -
(A) makes, transmits, or otherwise makes available any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;
(B) makes a telephone call or utilizes a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation
or communications ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person at the called number or who receives the communication;
(D) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates communication with a
telecommunications device, during which conversation or communication ensues, solely to
harass any person at the called number or who receives the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any
purpose prohibited by this section,
shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
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electronic communication into the section proscribing- the repeated or
continuous ringing of another person's telephone.92 Also, the changes in
the other sections recognize that electronic commuaication requires
different statutory language.93
However, the bill contains no protections against mass flaming or
letter bombs, or for persons who receive harassing E-mail but do not read
it. This reflects the bill's greatest flaw: It fails to define
"communication." This creates a semantic problem similar to the
interpretation of "conversation" illustrated by United States v. Lampley.94
That is, at what stage of an electronic communication does
communication ensue? Nothing within the amencment suggests a
conclusion, leaving the subject open to various interpretations by the
courts.
Senator Exon's proposal is more comprehensive, is a strong step in the
right direction, and would serve a useful purpose, but it is not ideal.
Language that addresses the above concerns would result in a more
workable federal law that recognizes the realities of E-mail harassment
and its scope. For the reasons set out in part IV, however, Congress
should consider separate provisions for telephoae and E-mail
harassment.
IV. STANDARDS FOR AN EFFECTIVE E-MAIL HMASSMENT
LAW
Several elements will help an E-mail harassment law survive
constitutional challenges and promote its effectiveness. First, the statute
should require that an actor possess a specific intent to 'harass the victim.
Second, it should have separate sections to recognize the technological
differences between the telephone and other forms of electronic
communication. Third, it should proscribe anonymous E-mail and
single, identified messages sent in a mass flaming. Finally, the statute
ought to recognize that repeated contact should include a combination of
telephonic and other forms of electronic communication.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C).
93. For example, Senator Exon's inclusion of "image" in 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A) recognizes the
realities of fax machines and digitized computer images.
94. 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978). See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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A. Specific Intent: A Safeguard Against Infringing Free Speech
The potential for treading on constitutional rights is a primary concern
in any effort to criminalize E-mail harassment. However, there is no
absolute rule against proscriptions on speech." This principle is
embodied in statutes that take telephone harassment out of the realm of
speech and define it as conduct under a specific intent element. 96 Such a
conduct-based approach also would support efforts to make E-mail
harassment a crime.
Nevertheless, the courts clearly have said that laws proscribing some
forms of speech must not restrict protected speech97 nor be vague
regarding the types of conduct they prohibit.98 A statute is overly broad
if it may reasonably be interpreted to prohibit conduct that is
constitutionally protected.99 Laws are void for vagueness and thus
violate due process if they fail to give an average person adequate notice
of what constitutes prohibited conduct or provide too little guidance to
police, judges, and juries, thereby forcing them to apply their own
standards.1°°
Rulings on the constitutionality of telephone harassment statutes
provide guidance for designing E-mail harassment laws. Courts
generally have judged telephone harassment statutes on two grounds.
First, United States v. Lampley'0 ' and the long line of cases that follow its
reasoning stand for the premise that the caller must possess the specific
intent to harass the person called."e A subjective standard that bases
95. Id. at 787. See supra note 84.
96. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 494 P.2d 68, 70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Yates v. Commonwealth, 753
S.W.2d 874, 875-76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
97. Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 115
(1989); Roe v. Meese, 689 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Radford v. Webb, 446 F. Supp. 608
(W.D.N.C. 1978), afl'd, 596 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1979).
98. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
99. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288
(1964).
100. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
101. 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978).
102. Id. at 787 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02 (1945)); State v. Hagen,
558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Baker v. State, 494 P.2d 68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); State v.
Jaeger, 249 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1977); Caldwell v. State, 337 A.2d 476 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975);
People v. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Zeit, 539 P.2d 1130 (Or. Ct.
App. 1975); Alobaidi v. State, 433 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 943 (1968).
Washington Law Review
culpability too much on the effect on the victim is insufficient. 3
Second, statutes that might otherwise infiinge on protected freedoms also
must proscribe specific conduct that goes beyond pure speech.' A
statute that proscribes a telephone call made with the specific intent to
annoy or harass another person, without more, is overbroad.105
Statutes are saved by proscribing the manner and means of telephone
calls, rather than their content. Calls that violate standaxds of reasonable
time, place, and manner, including anonymous calls, repeated calls, and
calls made late at night, do not elicit free speech concems."° Similarly,
proscriptions against mass flaming and letter bombs would be conduct-
based and not subject to free speech concerns. Nevertheless, conduct
generally is not proscribed under telephone harassmenat statutes unless
the applicable statute also includes an element of specific intent."0 Thus,
an E-mail harassment statute designed with an element of specific intent
tied to specific conduct, such as anonymous or obscene E-mail, repeated
or serial flaming, and letter bombs, should pass constitutional muster.
Vagueness concerns in telephone harassment statutes usually arise
with sections proscribing obscene telephone calls and including such
amorphous terms as "lewd," "profane," "indecer.t," "lascivious,"
"filthy," and "vulgar."' 8 As in State v. Hagen, 9 courts generally have
held that such wording is saved by its connection to conduct and intent
103. Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal
Statute Forbidding Use of Telephone To Annoy or Harass, 95 A.L.R. 3d 411,420-22 (1979) (citing
People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. 1977)); Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975). See also
Sohn, supra note 52, at 229.
Some statutes combine a subjective element with a specific intent element. See, e.g., Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 525.080 (Baldwin 1984). Other statutes include an objectiv,. standard along with a
specific intent requirement. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-1 1-8(b)(1) (1994). In such statutes, any
subjective standard apparently is presumed to be included within the complaint feature. That is, a
person who feels harassed will complain. The state must then prove that the defendant possessed the
requisite intent to harass the victim and, in states such as Alabama that also include an objective
standard, whether a reasonable person would have felt harassed.
104. Foster, supra note 103, at 415.
105. Klick 362 N.E.2d at 331 (Otherwise, "[tihe act constituting the offense is complete when the
call is made, regardless of the character of the conduct that subsequently ocears.).
106. See id.; Hagen, 558 P.2d at 753; Baker, 494 P.2d at 70; State v. Ancnymous, 389 A.2d 1270
(Conn. Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 382 A.2d 1332 (Conn. 1978), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980).
107. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(2).
108. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(A); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(l.); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-2916 (1989); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:285 (West 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-196 (1993); 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5504 (1983).
109. 558 P.2d 750, 753 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
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rather than to speech alone."' Although a section proscribing obscene E-
mail is warranted and would be constitutional, Texas took a different
tack. Despite a favorable ruling on the state's telephone harassment
statute,"' the Texas legislature struck all terms except "obscene" and
then defined the term.'
B. The Statute Must Recognize Technological Differences
Separate sections, although they will be duplicative in parts, are
needed to address the basic technological differences between the
telephone and other electronic communication. For example, a statute
that discusses the continuous ringing of a telephone"' or calling at an
inconvenient hour"4 cannot be easily adapted to a mass flaming by E-
mail. 15 Also, a separate section can address letter bombs better than an
analogy to non-stop calling that ties up a person's telephone or forces
that person to disconnect it.
Similarly, the conversational aspect of many telephone harassment
statutes poses a significant hurdle to prosecuting E-mail abuse. Verbal
conversation per se does not take place during E-mail communication' 16
and the electronic equivalent of conversation (i.e., message exchange) is
not required for E-mail harassment to occur." 7 Such considerations also
should address the potential effects of unread E-mail." 8
Other technological differences also require separate sections. For
example, because computers and fax machines" 9 can transmit images as
well as words, telephone statutes limited to words or language are not
sufficient. Finally, a separate provision that defines electronic
110. Baker, 494 P.2d at 70; Anonymous, 389 A.2d 1270; Yates v. Commonwealth, 753 S.W. 2d
874,875-76 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
111. Le Blanc v. State, 441 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
112. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.07(b) (West 1994).
113. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C).
114. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(2).
115. See supra note 80.
116. See supra note 62.
117. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
119. Fax abuse also would be included under language that incorporates electronic
communication in general. Some states have addressed harassment by fax but not other forms of
electronic communication. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53A-183 (1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4113
(Supp. 1994); RI. Gen. Laws § 11-35-17 (1994).
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communication 2 0 will be adaptable to advances in ekctronic media as
well as to new technologies, including cellular and other wireless
communication. Such provisions will provide a mcre effective tool
against harassment across all media.
C. The Statute Must Proscribe Anonymous E-mail and Single,
Identified Contact in Mass Flaming
Just as telephone harassment laws recognize that anonymous
telephone calls, regardless of content, constitute a form of harassment,
laws addressing E-mail harassment also should recognize the reality and
effect of anonymous E-mail.' Although an anonymous E-mail message
may not elicit the same response as a midnight call from a "breather,"
neither do all anonymous telephone calls have the same effect. Yet
blanket provisions in telephone harassment laws fail to differentiate
between types of anonymous calls." Further, an artonymous E-mail
message, like an anonymous telephone call, may be symptomatic of a
much larger scheme of harassment.'
Single, identified contact that is neither obscene nor threatening also
needs to be addressed, at least in the mass flaming con:ext.124 The court
in United States v. Darsey"z described the purpose of laws that do not
proscribe single calls from an identified caller 26 as insurance against a
120. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12) (Supp. 1995) defines electronic communication as "any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photooptical system."
121. Andrews, supra note 20, at J6, explained the scope of the anonymity problem:
Hackers, software pirates and outlaws use anonymity to avoid the law. The Internet's highly
publicized negatives-flaming, stalking, letter bombing-often can be traced back to the ease
with which one can use an assumed name or false ID.... Although not all flamers decline to use
their real names, anonymity encourages flaming, or hate e-mail, by protecting the sender from
the usual social sanctions.
122. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(2).
123. See supra note 29.
124. A state considering an electronic communications harassment statate may wish to follow
Connecticut's example, infra note 128, and proscribe single, identified contact that constitutes
harassment, but is neither obscene nor threatening. This would incorporate all such single messages,
not just those sent in a mass flaming. Such a provision is not included in the proposed statute, infra
part V.A, which still would require repeated contact in non-obscene, non-threatening circumstances.
If the Washington legislature takes this step, however, it also should consider adding a third element
to the felony section of proposed Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230(c), infra part V.A., including
harassing messages or telephone calls that are part of concerted action.
125. 342 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
126. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(D).
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flood of complaints stemming from unpleasant calls between
acquaintances, which it called one of the ordinary consequences of
telephone usage. 127
Many states, however, proscribe such calls128 and language in Darsey
actually supports such a proscription." 9 A mass flaming is repeated
contact constituting a "single episode"'3 and does not involve a "single
unpleasant call with some acquaintance,'' but a series of such contacts.
Because Congress wrote the federal law to prevent "ingenious persons
from escaping the effect of the other sections by the structuring of their
-,harassment,"'32 mass flaming should not be disregarded simply because it
involves individual action.13
D. The Statute Must Provide for a Combination of Harassment by
Telephone and Other Electronic Communication to Constitute
Repeated Harassment
A new statute must address the possibility that a person may commit
harassment by both telephone and other electronic communication. Most
telephone harassment statutes proscribe repeated telephone calls made
with the intent to harass or intimidate the person called. Two calls in
"close enough proximity" to constitute a "single episode" suffice. 34  A
person who harasses another person first with a telephone call and then
follows up with a harassing E-mail message, or vice versa, should not be
127. Darsey, 342 F. Supp. at 313.
128. See, e-g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53A-183(a)(3) (1994). This section was added in 1971
specifically to "include the single telephone call for the purpose of annoyance or harassment"
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53A-183, Historical Notes.
129. Ideally, an E-mail harassment law should encompass mass flaming situations in which
computer users either take concerted action or take it upon themselves to send a flaming message.
See supra note 124. In the latter instance, most E-mail users are sophisticated enough to know that a
flaming message sent in response to a message circulated on a network is going to be one of many
such messages that person receives.
130. Darsey, 342 F. Supp. at 313.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Messages placed on electronic bulletin boards also could fall under the intent of the model
statute, infra part V.A. Electronic bulletin boards generally are governed by the precepts of the
public forum doctrine. Just as persons at a speech in a public square are free to shout epithets at the
speaker, the users of electronic bulletin boards are free to voice their opinions, subject to the
limitations of libel, privacy, and other civil concerns. However, messages that are sent with the
requisite intent and exceed the bounds of the statute, such as threatening messages, would be
proscribed.
134. Darsey, 342 F. Supp. at 313.
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able to avoid prosecution under electronic communication harassment
statutes that require repeated contact by the same person.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR MODEL LEGISLATION IN WASHINGTON
Washington, like most states, has yet to adapt its harassment statute to
encompass E-mail. In fact, the Washington law.35 wo'ald be one of the
most difficult in the nation to extend to E-mail harassment.13 6
Washington also has no specific provision within its anti-stalking statute
for contact by electronic communication, including the telephone.'37
While several states have addressed electronic communication
harassment within anti-stalking statutes, the federal government and
several states are moving in the telephone harassment area. Given the
uncertain and fluid nature of anti-stalking statutes,' their limited
applicability to E-mail harassment, and the more solid footing of
telephone harassment laws in general, Washington would be well-
advised to address this problem via its own telephone harassment
statute. 139
In addition to the elements noted in part IV, a Washington statute
should allow a judge to order forfeiture of computer hardware and
software used in the commission of electronic communication
harassment. 4 California and New Mexico, for example, provide for
forfeiture for violations of their computer crime statutes. 4' Washington
law also provides for the forfeiture of any property used in the
135. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.230.
136. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. The statute also does not proscribe
harassment by written communication in general.
137. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.110 (Supp. 1995).
138. Many states, including California, which pioneered this area, already have amended their
anti-stalking statutes. Eight states changed their laws in 1993. Christina Carmody, Deadly Mistakes,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 68, 69.
139. Washington's statute includes a specific intent element. The statute has been the subject of
appellate review only once, but the court was not asked to rule on its constitutionality. State v.
Ashker, I I Wash. App. 423, 523 P.2d 949 (1974), partially overruled on other grounds by State v.
Braithwaite, 92 Wash. 2d 624, 600 P.2d 1260 (1979).
140. This approach was suggested by Davis, supra note 1, at 440, as an added deterrent against
the creation or transmission of malevolent software, such as viruses. Similarly, a forfeiture provision
would serve as an added deterrent within a new Washington law on el-ectronic communication
harassment. The proposed forfeiture provision would allow seizure of either telephone or computer
equipment. The equipment of persons other than the offender also would te subject to forfeiture if
the owners had prior knowledge of the offense. Such persons already are subject to criminal
prosecution under the existing telephone harassment statute. See infra note 144.
141. Cal. Penal Code § 502.01 (West Supp. 1994); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-45-7 (1989).
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commission of a felony42 and includes authority for forfeiture in some
misdemeanor cases.1
43
Finally, language needs to be added to other statutes, including those
that extend proscriptions to persons who knowingly allow their
telephones to be used for harassment 4 4' establish that harassment is
committed at either end of a harassing telephone call; 4 and list crimes
included in the term "harassment."' 146
A. Washington Revised Code § 9.61.230
Under the proposals outlined above, the existing statute would be
retitled: "Communications to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass."
The existing statute through section (3) would be lettered (a) and would
conclude with the language "shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor,
except as provided in subsection (c)." The rest of the statute, beginning
with a new subsection (b), would read as follows:
(b) Every person who, with intent to harass, intimidate, torment, or
embarrass any other person, shall send a written or electronic
communication received or read by such other person or any other
person, whether or not such communication or communications are
read in their entirety or at all:
(1) Using any lewd, lascivious, profane, indecent, or obscene
words, language, pictures, images, or graphics, or suggesting the
commission of any lewd or lascivious act; or
(2) Anonymously or repeatedly or in connection with repeated or
serial communications by another person or persons or in a manner
142. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.105.010 (Supp. 1995). The statute outlines procedures for seizure of
property, notice, claim of ownership, hearing, and disposition of property.
143. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 75.10.110 (1994).
A forfeiture provision in the E-mail harassment law should contain procedures similar to those
outlined in Washington's existing forfeiture law, supra note 142, or make specific reference to that
statute. The proposed statute, infra part V.A., takes the latter approach. However, this may be
insufficient The forfeiture statute deals exclusively with felonies, while most E-mail harassment
would be defined as a misdemeanor.
144. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.240 (1988) provides: "Any person who knowingly permits any
telephone under his control to be used for any purpose prohibited by RCW 9.61.230 shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor."
145. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.61.250 (1988) provides: "Any offense committed by use of a telephone
as set forth in RCW 9.61.230 may be deemed to have been committed either at the place from which
the telephone call or calls were made or at the place where the telephone call or calls were received."
146. Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.060 (Supp. 1995).
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which (i) causes interruption in telephone service or (ii) prevents
the person contacted from utilizing his or her telephone service or
electronic communications device;
(3) Threatening to inflict injury on the person or property of the
person to whom the communication is directed or any member of
his or her family or household;
shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor, except as provided in
subsection (c).
(c) Any person convicted under either subsection (a) or subsection
(b) of this section is guilty of a class C felony if:
(1) That person has previously been convicted of any crime of
harassment, as defined in RCW 9A.46.060, with the same victim or
member of the victim's family or household or any person
specifically named in a no-contact or no-harassment order in this or
any other state; or
(2) That person harasses another person under subsection (a)(3) or
subsection (b)(3) of this section by threatening to il the person
threatened or any other person.
(d) In accordance with RCW 10.105.010, the court may order
forfeiture of telephonic or electronic communications equipment
used in violation of this statute if such equipment either is owned
by the offender or by a person who, in violation of RCW 9.61.240,
knowingly allows such equipment to be used in violation of this
section.
(e) For the purposes of this section, "electronic communication" is
defined as any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by
a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric or photo-optical
system.
(f) For the purposes of subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2) of this section,
a combination of one telephone call and one electronic
communication made or sent within a six-month period with intent
to harass, intimidate, torment, or embarrass any other person, shall
constitute repeated contact.
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B. Washington Revised Code § 9.61.240
This statute would be amended to read as follows:
Any person who knowingly permits any telephone or electronic
communications device under his control to be used for any
purpose prohibited by RCW 9.61.230 shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.
C. Washington Revised Code § 9.61.250
This statute would be amended to read as follows:
Any offense committed by use of a telephone or electronic
communications device as set forth in RCW 9.61.230 may be
deemed to have been committed either at the place from which the
telephone call or calls were made or electronic communication or
communications were sent or at the place where the telephone call
or calls or the electronic communication or communications were
received.
D. Washington Revised Code § 9A.46.060
Section (3) would be amended to read as follows:
Communications harassment (RCW 9.61.230);
VI. CONCLUSION
Computer abuse is expanding more rapidly than the applicable law.
E-mail harassment is one area where the law is lagging. Efforts at both
the state and federal levels either fail to recognize fully the scope of the
problem or the technology involved, or pin their hopes on statutes with a
short and shaky constitutional history. Something more comprehensive
is required. A constitutional model exists in telephone harassment
statutes that can be expanded to address adequately the characteristics
and scope of electronic communication harassment. Washington, in
particular, is in need of such legislation. By acting now, the state can
take the lead in responding to the challenges presented by developing
technology in this area.
Given the rapid growth of electronic communication, the problem of
harassment only threatens to worsen. If this problem is met head-on,
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society stands a better chance of heading it off. Today, because of laws
that set out the legal rules for telephone use, people know what type of
behavior is proscribed and that those who cross the line -will be punished.
Likewise, years from now, we should be able to say that we have made it
easier and safer for everyone to travel along the information
superhighway.
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